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We present an approach to the unconditional security of quantum key distribution protocols
based on the uncertainty principle. The approach applies to every case that has been treated via
the argument by Shor and Preskill, and relieve them from the constraints of finding quantum error
correcting codes. It can also treat the cases with uncharacterized apparatuses. We derive a secure
key rate for the Bennett-Brassard-1984 protocol with an arbitrary source characterized only by a
single parameter representing the basis dependence.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd 03.67.-a
The aim of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to dis-
tribute a secret key between two distant parties, Alice
and Bob, under the intervention by a third party, Eve.
For any protocol of QKD, it is vital to have a proof of
the unconditional security because the robustness against
any kind of attack allowed by the law of physics is the
main advantage of QKD over classical schemes aiming
at the same task. One of the well-known strategies for
the security proof is the argument [1] given by Shor and
Preskill, in which a reduction to an entanglement distil-
lation protocol (EDP) based on Calderbank-Shor-Steane
(CSS) quantum error correcting codes (QECC) [2, 3] is
used to show that the information leak on the final key
is negligible. This approach has turned out to be quite
versatile due to the simplicity of the idea: for example,
the original proof for the BB84 protocol [4] has been ex-
tended [5, 6] to cover the B92 protocol [7]. On the other
hand, invoking the CSS-QECC in the proof requires the
actual users to find a quantum code satisfying a certain
property, which is not always an easy task. Even the
innocent-looking formula [Eq. (1) below] for the asymp-
totic key gain needs a complicated argument [8] for strict
derivation.
If we look back to the first proof [9] of unconditional
security by Mayers, we notice that it also has its own
merits. One disadvantage, the complexity of the proof,
was recently remedied by a simple proof [10] by Koashi
and Preskill based on the same spirit, namely, reduction
to a two-party protocol by omitting one of the legitimate
users by a symmetry argument. In this line of approach,
the error correction and the privacy amplification is de-
coupled once we encrypt the communication for the er-
ror correction, by consuming the previously shared key.
This implies that we do not need to find a CSS-QECC
and we can just use conventional schemes for the error
correction. The proof also shows a peculiar and useful
property, which allows the use of basis-independent un-
characterized sources or detectors. For example, if we
use an ideal detector, the source can be anything as long
as it does not reveal which basis is used in the BB84 pro-
tocol. We can still use the same formula for the key rate,
indicating that any fault in the source can be automat-
ically caught in the form of an increase in the observed
bit errors. Unfortunately, the argument of omitting one
party relies heavily on the symmetry of the BB84 pro-
tocol, and it cannot be applied to the protocols with no
such symmetry.
In this paper, we present an approach to the uncondi-
tional security based on uncertainty principle. This ar-
gument has the same advantages in the Mayers-Koashi-
Preskill argument, while retaining the versatility of the
Shor-Preskill argument. In fact, in any protocol having
a proof that relies on the Shor-Preskill argument, we can
decouple the error correction and the privacy amplifica-
tion just by encrypting the former, thereby relieve it from
the constraint of CSS-QECC. We can also treat unchar-
acterized apparatuses in the protocols with lower sym-
metry. As an example, we derive a key rate formula for
the BB84 protocol with an arbitrary source, the proper-
ties of which are unknown except for a bound on a single
parameter describing the basis dependence.
Most of the QKD protocols can be equivalently de-
scribed by an entanglement-based protocol, in which Al-
ice and Bob share a pair of quantum systems HA ⊗HB
after discarding other systems used for random sampling
tests. The state ρ0 of HA⊗HB at this point is not fixed
and may be highly correlated among subsystems due to
Eve’s intervention, but the results of the tests may give a
set of promises on the possible state. For example, in the
case of Shor-Preskill proof, HA ⊗ HB is composed of N
pairs of shared qubits, and there is a promise that the fol-
lowing statements hold except for an exponentially small
probability: Suppose that each qubit is measured on z
or x basis. Then the number nbit of qubits showing the
bit error (σz ⊗ σz = −1) satisfies nbit/N ≤ δbit, and the
number nph with the phase error (σx⊗σx = −1) satisfies
nph/N ≤ δph. Here δbit and δph are determined from the
results of the test. Here we consider more general cases,
in which the size ofHA⊗HB is arbitrary. We give a proof
for the unconditional security of the protocols having the
2following form:
Actual Protocol — Alice and Bob make measurements
on HA and on HB, respectively. Through an encrypted
classical communication consuming r bits of secret key,
they agree on an N -bit reconciled key κrec, except for a
negligible failure probability. In the binary vector space
on N bits, one party chooses a linearly-independent set
{Vk}k=1,...,N−m of N -bit sequences randomly and an-
nounce it. The k-th bit of the final key κfin is defined
as scalar product κrec · Vk.
This protocol newly produces N−m bits of secret key,
and the net secret key gain is N − r −m bits. The core
of our approach is to choose a quantum operation Λ that
converts state ρ on HA⊗HB to state Λ(ρ) onHR⊗K⊗N ,
where K⊗N stands for N qubits and HR for an ancillary
system R. Both the qubits and the ancilla are virtual,
and there is no need to specify corresponding physical
systems in the actual protocol. We allow Λ to involve
collective operations over HA and HB. We only require
the following property for Λ: Let us regard κrec in Actual
Protocol as the outcome of a generalized measurement
applied on HA⊗HB. Then, the application of Λ followed
by the z-basis measurements on the N qubits should be
equivalent to this measurement of κrec. If Λ is chosen in
this way, the security of Actual Protocol follows that of
Protocol 1 below, in which Alice and Bob can be regarded
as a single party:
Protocol 1 — Apply Λ and discard HR. For the N
qubits K⊗N , measure each qubit on z-basis to determine
the N -bit key κrec. Choose a linearly-independent set
{Vk}k=1,...N−m randomly, and announce it to Eve. Let
κrec · Vk be the k-th bit of the final key κfin.
In order to show that Eve has negligible information on
κfin, we consider yet another protocol. Suppose that, fol-
lowing Λ, we conduct a measurement MR on the ancilla
R to obtain outcome µ, and subsequently measure each
of the N qubits on x basis to obtain an N -bit sequence
X. We further choose a number ξ (depending on the test
results) such that the promise on the initial state ρ0 al-
most guarantees that for each outcome µ, we can predict
the value of X with Nξ-bit uncertainty. More precisely,
we take the following assumption:
Assumption—There exists a set Tµ ofN -bit sequences
with cardinality |Tµ| ≤ 2Nξ for each µ, such that the pair
of measurement outcomes (µ,X) satisfiesX ∈ Tµ except
for an exponentially small probability η.
Now we can invoke the uncertainty principle: Since
the x-basis outcomes for the N qubits can be predicted
with Nξ-bit uncertainty, the complementary observable,
namely, the z-basis outcomes, should be predicted by any
party with at most N(1− ξ) uncertainty [11]. Hence we
expect to extract N(1 − ξ) bits of secret key from the
z-basis outcomes. This rough sketch can be made strict
as follows.
Suppose that, before the measurement of X, we
choose m = N(ξ + ǫ) random N -bit sequences Wj(j =
1, . . . ,m) and measure the parity X ·Wj by a collec-
tive projection measurement on the qubits. If we de-
fine Σν(W ) ≡ σb1ν σb2ν · · ·σbNν (ν = x, z) for N -bit se-
quence W = [b1b2 · · · bN ], the above parity measure-
ment for X ·Wj corresponds to the observable Σx(Wj).
Recall that we know X ∈ Tµ except for probability
η. As in the hushing method of EDP [12], by know-
ing m random parity bits we can derive an estimate
X
∗ of X with an exponentially small failure probability
Pr(X∗ 6= X) ≤ η′ ≡ η + 2−Nǫ. If we apply a phase-flip
operation Σz(X
∗) according to the estimate, the state σ
of the qubits should become almost a pure state, satis-
fying 〈0⊗Nx |σ|0⊗Nx 〉 ≥ 1 − η′, where |0⊗Nx 〉 is the x-basis
eigenstate for X = 0. With this property in mind, let us
consider the following protocol:
Protocol 2 — Apply Λ and make measurement MR
on HR. Choose Wj(j = 1, . . .m) randomly, and take
an arbitrary linearly-independent set {Vk}k=1,...N−m of
N -bit sequences satisfying Vk ·Wj = 0 for any j, k. An-
nounce {Vk} to Eve. Measure Σx(Wj) to determine X∗,
and apply Σz(X
∗). Measure {Σz(Vk)} to determine the
(N −m)-bit final key κfin.
When Assumption holds with ǫ > 0, the above final
key is determined by z-basis measurements applied to σ,
which is very close to the x-basis pure eigenstate |0⊗Nx 〉.
Hence Eve has only negligible (at most S(σ)-bit) infor-
mation about κfin.
The equivalence of the two protocols are easy to be
seen. In Protocol 2, the operators {Σz(Vk)} commute
with Σz(X
∗) and with Σx(Wj) since Vk ·Wj = 0. Hence
we can omit the parity check and the phase flip and still
obtain the same final key. We further notice that MR is
now redundant, and the choosing method of {Vk} can be
simplified to a random selection. Noting that {Σz(Vk)}
can be also obtained through a z-basis measurement on
each qubit, we are lead to Protocol 1. We thus obtain
the main theorem:
Theorem — If Assumption is true for m = N(ξ + ǫ)
with ǫ > 0, Eve’s information on κfin in Protocol 1 is at
most h(η′) +Nη′ with η′ = η + 2−Nǫ.
Here we have defined h(y) ≡ −y log y−(1−y) log(1−y).
The choice of Λ and MR, which determines ξ, is crucial
in deriving a good lower bound of the achievable secure
key gain for various problems. We will discuss several
examples below.
Shor-Preskill case — In the situation to which the
Shor-Preskill argument applies, HA⊗HB corresponds to
N pairs of qubits. In this case, we choose κrec to be Bob’s
measurement outcome on z basis. If the promise is given
by the two numbers δbit and δph as we mentioned earlier,
Alice can determine κrec from her z-basis measurement
and r = N [h(δph)+ǫ] bits of communication from Bob in
Actual protocol. For the security proof, we choose a triv-
ial Λ that just changes the definition as HA ∼= HR and
HB ∼= K⊗N . We assume MR to be the x-basis measure-
ment on Alice’s N qubits. It should reveal the value of
3X, which is Bob’s outcome on x basis, within δph bits of
errors, and Assumption holds with ξ = h(δph)+ ǫ. Hence
we arrive at the familiar asymptotic net key gain
G = N [1− h(δbit)− h(δph)]. (1)
Unlike the Shor-Preskill proof, this key rate is achieved
without finding a CSS-QECC.
BB84 with a basis-independent uncharacterized source
— This is the case where Alice uses a basis-independent
uncharacterized source and Bob uses an ideal detector
in the BB84 protocol, which was analyzed in [10]. Let
ρab acting on HQ be the state of Alice’s source for the
basis a = 0, 1 and the bit value b = 0, 1. Alice chooses
basis a randomly, and then with probability pab (note
that pa0 + pa1 = 1), Alice sends out ρab to a quantum
channel, which may be tampered by Eve. Bob receives
a qubit state on KB from the channel, on which he con-
ducts the ideal z- or x-basis measurement depending on
his random basis choice a′ = 0, 1, respectively. Subse-
quently, they make a and a′ public. After repeating this
many times, they randomly sample events with a = a′ to
determine the observed error rates δa for a = 0, 1. Bob
randomly picks N outcomes from the unsampled data
with a = a′ = 0 to define κrec. Alice obtains κrec with
the help of a secret communication from Bob consuming
r = N [h(δ0) + ǫ] bits of secret key. (The portion with
a = a′ = 1 can be handled similarly.)
The basis-independent source satisfies ρ0 = ρ1, where
ρa ≡ pa0ρa0 + pa1ρa1. Then, we can find a state χ on
HS ⊗HQ and measurements Ma on HS with POVM el-
ements {Fa0, Fa1}, such that TrS [(Fab ⊗ 1Q)χ] = pabρab.
We are thus allowed to consider an equivalent protocol in
which Alice prepares χ and conducts measurement Ma
on HS to determine her bit value b. This new protocol
takes the form of Actual protocol by defining HA = H⊗NS
andHB = K⊗NB . For the security proof, we choose a triv-
ial Λ that just changes the definition as HA ∼= HR and
HB ∼= K⊗N . We then assume MR to be M1 applied on
each HS . In order to establish a statement like Assump-
tion, we need to know the relation between the outcome
of M1 and the outcome of the x-basis measurement on
KB. Fortunately, this is exactly the same pair of mea-
surements used in determining the error rate δ1. Hence
Assumption holds with ξ = h(δ1) + ǫ, and we obtain the
asymptotic net key gain
G = N [1− h(δ0)− h(δ1)]. (2)
Note that everything we need in the actual protocol is
δ0 and δ1. There is no need to know the identities of χ
and Ma, and hence no need to characterize the source
to determine ρab, as long as it is guaranteed to be basis-
independent.
BB84 with a basis-dependent uncharacterized source—
The main theorem allows us to prove unconditional se-
curity in the general case of ρ0 6= ρ1. Of course, we need
to know something about the source states since the pro-
tocol is entirely insecure if ρ0 and ρ1 are orthogonal. A
natural choice is to assume that we know a single param-
eter ∆, which determines a lower bound on the fidelity
[13, 14] between the two states:
1− 2∆ ≤
√
F (ρ0, ρ1) ≡ Tr(√ρ1ρ0√ρ1)1/2. (3)
Note that for F < 1, we can still find two pure states |χ0〉
and |χ1〉 inHS⊗HQ satisfying 〈χ0|χ1〉 = 1−2∆ such that
for each value of a, there is a POVM measurementMa =
{Fa0, Fa1} on HS satisfying TrS [(Fab ⊗ 1Q)|χa〉〈χa|] =
pabρab. For a special case where HS includes a qubit
as a subsystem and M0 and M1 are the standard x-
and z-basis measurement on that qubit, Gottesman et
al. [15] derived a secure key rate along the line of Shor-
Preskill argument, which allows positive key gain up to
∆ < 0.029. Here we can derive a better key rate formula
for arbitrary states {ρab}.
Let us consider an equivalent protocol in which Alice
chooses the basis a by measuring a “quantum coin” [15]
described by a qubit KC . If she prepares HS ⊗HQ⊗KC
in state |Ψ〉 ≡ (|χ0〉|0z〉C + |χ1〉|1z〉C)/
√
2 and measure
KC on z basis, the outcome a is random and HS ⊗HQ is
prepared in state |χa〉. Then she conducts measurement
Ma on HS to prepare ρab with probability pab. In order
to prove security, we follow the same argument as in the
basis-independent case up to the point where we need to
know the relation between the outcome of M1 and that
of x-basis measurement on KB . Unfortunately, we have
no direct clue this time. The expected error rate δph in
this fictitious set of measurements is no longer equal to
δ1, since the former is taken for a = 0 and the latter is
for a = 1.
In order to determine upper bounds on δph, let us con-
sider the following scenario. Alice starts from |Ψ〉⊗L,
and she immediately sends the L copies of system Q into
the channel. After Eve’s attack, Bob receives the qubits
K⊗LB . For every pair of systemsHS⊗KB, Bob may choose
a′ randomly, but regardless of its value, measurement
M1 and x-basis measurement are applied to determine
whether there is an error (t = 1) or not (t = 0). Finally,
Alice measures the coin KC on z basis to determine a.
Let us denote the empirical probability for the L events
by r(·). For example, r(t = 1|a = 0) is the number of
events with (t = 1, a = 0) divided by that of events with
a = 0.
The rate δph can be regarded as an error rate in a fair
sampling from the events with a = a′ = 0. Since a′ has no
effect in the above scenario, it can also be regarded as a
fair sampling from the events with a = 0. We thus have
δph ∼= r(t = 1|a = 0). Similarly, δ1 ∼= r(t = 1|a = 1).
Since r(a = 0) ∼= 1/2, we have
r(t = 1) ∼= (δ1+δph)/2, r(a = 1|t = 1) ∼= δ1/(δ1+δph),
r(a = 0|t = 0) ∼= (1− δph)/(2− δ1 − δph). (4)
4Now we describe two methods of deriving a bound on
δph. The first one is to apply the main theorem for-
mally to the coins, regarding K⊗LC as K⊗N in the theo-
rem. Since ‖C〈1x||Ψ〉‖2 = ∆, it is guaranteed that we
can distill a secret key of length L(1−h(∆)− ǫ) from the
z-basis measurement results. This implies that even with
the knowledge of each t, the entropy of the outcomes a
should be larger than L(1− h(∆)− ǫ). Hence we have
1− h(∆) ≤ δ1 + δph
2
h
(
δ1
δ1 + δph
)
+
2− δ1 − δph
2
h
(
1− δph
2− δ1 − δph
)
≤ h
(
1− |δph − δ1|
2
)
,
(5)
which shows that δph = δ1 for ∆ = 0 and δph becomes
larger when ∆ > 0. If we write the maximum of δph
under the above first inequality as f(δ1,∆), the key gain
is given by
G = N [1− h(δ0)− h(max{1/2, f(δ1,∆)})]. (6)
This key gain is positive only for ∆ < 0.056.
The second method is more complicated, but gives a
better rate. We assume that for each event, Alice draws
a random binary variable s with a small probability of
being s = 1. If s = 0, she just follows the above sce-
nario, but if s = 1, she measures the coin KC on x basis
instead of z basis. Let a¯ be the outcome of this x basis
measurement, and define rx,j ≡ r(a¯ = 1|s = 1, t = j)
and rz,j ≡ r(a = 0|s = 0, t = j) for j = 0, 1. Since
‖C〈1x||Ψ〉‖2 = ∆, we have
r(t = 0)rx,0 + r(t = 1)rx,1 = r(a¯ = 1|s = 1) ∼= ∆. (7)
Note that rx,j is determined from the outcomes of x-
basis measurements applied to random samples from the
qubits with t = j, and rz,j is from the z-basis outcomes
for the rest of the qubits. This problem of random sam-
pling was analysed in [5], and it was shown that for all
ǫ > 0, except for an exponentially small probability, there
exists a qubit state ρ such that |rz,j − 〈0z|ρ|0z〉| < ǫ and
|rx,j − 〈1x|ρ|1x〉| < ǫ. We thus obtain the following rela-
tion in the asymptotic limit:
(1 − 2rx,j)2 + (1− 2rz,j)2 ≤ 1. (8)
Combining it with r(t = 1) ∼= (δ1 + δph)/2, rz,1 ∼=
δph/(δ1+δph), rz,0 ∼= (1−δph)/(2−δ1−δph), and Eq. (7),
we obtain
2∆ ≥ 1−
√
(1− δ1)(1 − δph)−
√
δ1δph. (9)
We can now take f(δ1,∆) to be the maximum of δph
under Eq. (9), and obtain a better key rate with Eq. (6).
Now the region of positive key gain extends to ∆ < 0.146,
or F (ρ0, ρ1) > 1/2. Since Alice and Bob do not use the
outcome a¯, this measurement can be omitted. Hence, in
the actual BB84 protocol, they only have to discard a
small portion of events. From Eve’s point of view, Alice
could have measured a¯ for the discarded events, and it is
enough to apply the above security proof.
We have described a method of proving the uncon-
ditional security which unifies two major previous ap-
proaches and retains the advantages in both of them. We
have also shown that the new method can solve a problem
which eluded the previous approaches. The proof relies
on the observation that Alice can guess the z-basis out-
comes of virtual N qubits with r-bit uncertainty in the
actual protocol, and Alice and Bob can guess the x-basis
outcomes with m-bit uncertainty in a equivalent proto-
col. The “excess” over the uncertainty limit, N − r−m,
amounts to the key gain. Note that if they share a max-
imally entangled state, Alice alone can guess for both of
the bases. The condition for the secrecy is weaker than
that since it allows her to collaborate with Bob nonlo-
cally for the x basis. This difference is considered to
be a reason for the gap between distillable entanglement
and secret key gain [16]. This suggests that the present
method may potentially give a key rate exceeding the
amount of distillable entanglement.
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